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Risk management is a systematic and continuous approach to considering risks that 
organisations face. Its ultimate goal is to bring value. Risk assessment is a part of the risk 
management process. It includes the phases of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk 
evaluation. 
The objective of this functional thesis was to determine how to best develop the local risk 
assessment methods of the case company. The purpose was that those, who represent their 
sub-business units, can assess security risks in an efficient and reliable manner. The security 
lead can use these results to make an accurate and realistic risk assessment of the whole 
business unit.  
Literature review and participant observation were used to collect data. The literature review 
includes both general works in the field of risk management and company-specific material. 
Participant observation was performed throughout the process in workshops and other means 
of communication. Content analysis was exploited to analyse the collected data. 
The concrete outcome of this thesis is two products, a risk assessment tool and a guide to 
support risk assessment. The new tool is simple to use and highly automated in terms of 
calculations. It has a clear layout, colours, and summarising tables. The possibility of erroneous 
use has been eliminated as far as possible. The Security Risk Guide provides very concise 
explanations for the threats identified in the risk assessment tool and lists protective measures. 
It also contains questions to support risk assessment. 
It can be concluded that the output of this thesis meet the set objectives and that they help 
the security lead in making the final risk assessment of the whole business unit. The feedback 
has been positive. Especially the possibility to identify and report new threats has been 
considered an improvement. The risk assessment process could be developed further by 
providing more training for risk coordinators and by increasing cooperation between business 
units. 
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Riskienhallinta on organisaatioiden järjestelmällistä riskeihin varautumista. Sen perimmäinen 
tavoite on tuoda yritykselle lisäarvoa. Riskien arviointi on osa riskienhallintaprosessia. Siihen 
sisältyy seuraavat vaiheet: riskien tunnistaminen, riskianalyysi ja riskien merkitysten arviointi. 
Tämän toiminnallisen opinnäytetyön tarkoitus oli selvittää, miten paikallisia riskien arvioinnin 
menetelmiä voisi parhaiten kehittää yrityksessä. Tavoite oli, että liiketoimintayksikköjen 
riskikoordinaattorit pystyvät arvioimaan riskejä tehokkaasti ja luotettavasti. 
Turvallisuuspäällikkö hyödyntäisi näiden arvioiden tuloksia tehdessään turvallisuusriskien 
arvioinnin koko Suomen liiketoimintayksiköstä. 
Tiedonkeruumenetelminä on käytetty kirjallisuuskatsausta ja osallistuvaa havainnointia. 
Tietoperustaan sisältyy sekä riskienhallinnan yleisteoksia että toimeksiantajan laatimaa 
sisäistä materiaalia. Osallistuvaa havainnointia tehtiin pitkin kevättä muun muassa 
riskityöpajoissa. Kerättyä aineistoa analysoitiin sisällönanalyysin avulla. 
Opinnäytetyön tuloksena syntyi kaksi produktia: riskienarvioinnin työkalu ja opas. Uusi työkalu 
on yksinkertainen käyttää, ja siinä on hyödynnetty laskentakaavoja. Siinä on selkeä rakenne ja 
värit, ja arvioinnin tiivistetyt tulokset päivittyvät työkalun ylälaitaan. Virheellisen käytön 
mahdollisuus on estetty niin pitkälle kuin se on mahdollista. Opas sisältää ytimekkäät kuvaukset 
eri uhkakuvista ja keinot niiltä suojautumiseen. Oppaassa on lisäksi pohdintaa tukevia 
kysymyksiä.  
Voidaan todeta, että opinnäytetyön aikana tehdyt produktit ovat toimeksiannon mukaisia ja 
että ne tukevat Suomen turvallisuuspäällikköä riskien arvioinnissa. Lopputuotokset ovat 
saaneet positiivista palautetta. Erityisesti mahdollisuutta tunnistaa ja merkitä uusia riskejä on 
pidetty hyvänä uudistuksena. Kehittämisehdotuksena esitetään, että toimeksiantaja voisi 
parantaa riskienarviointiprosessiaan lisäämällä riskien arvioinnissa mukana olevien koulutusta 
sekä yhteistyötä liiketoimintayksikköjen välillä. 
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1 Introduction 
Uncertainty about the future is present in our everyday life. We cannot know the outcome of 
our own actions or events that we have no control of. Yet, we have to make decisions. This 
poses risks. Organisations that want to thrive have to take calculated risks and accept the 
possibility of failure (Hopkin 2017, 45). In our everyday life, as individuals, we rely on common 
sense, knowledge, experience, and even our instincts (Merna & Al-Thani 2010, 7). However, 
successful organisations should have a well-established and structured approach to risk 
management. This will help organisations in defining their strategy, reaching objectives, and 
making the right decisions. (SFS-ISO 31000:2018, 5.) Moreover, risk management should not be 
seen as merely a question of compliance. Rather, it supports organisations in identifying 
opportunities to expand, make profit, and gain good reputation, among other things. (Burns-
Howell, Cordier & Eriksson 2003, 67.) 
The writer of this thesis was employed by the case company in January 2018 as a Global Security 
Trainee. The company has developed an enterprise-level risk assessment tool which is used for 
annual risk assessments. It is a complicated, Excel-based tool which is best suited for reporting 
the final risk assessment results for the entire business unit. The need for a new risk assessment 
tool and supporting material for local use was established in the beginning of the employment. 
Thus, it was decided that, after the initial training period, a functional thesis would be carried 
out to develop and implement a new tool and a short guide for the purpose of risk workshops. 
Naturally, a regular presence on the company premises and access to useful resources offered 
an excellent starting point for this functional thesis. Also the timeframe was suitable: risk 
assessment for the fiscal year of 2019 was to be carried out in the spring. 
In this chapter, the objectives and the scope of this thesis are determined and some key 
concepts to support the reader are provided. The second chapter introduces the case company 
and describes its risk management and risk assessment approaches. The third chapter is 
dedicated to methodology, and the fourth chapter provides a theoretical framework about risks 
in general and risk management in particular. In the fifth chapter, the whole thesis process is 
explained, and the sixth chapter presents the results. The seventh chapter entails discussion. 
The final conclusions, including the writer’s own assessment of the thesis, are in the eight 
chapter. 
1.1 Objectives and Scope 
The objective of this functional thesis was to determine how to best develop the local risk 
assessment methods of the case company. If the new methods prove successful, they can be 
implemented in future risk assessments also in other business units. The purpose was that those, 
who represent their sub-business units, can assess security risks in an efficient and reliable 
manner. With the help of these results, Finland’s security lead will be able to make an accurate 
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and realistic risk assessment of the whole business unit. The final results will be put into the 
original enterprise-level risk assessment tool which will then be approved and sent to the 
headquarters abroad for final instructions and recommendations. Participants of the risk 
workshops will be given feedback also on a local level. 
The identified research question is: 
What kind of local risk assessment method would support the security lead in assessing 
security risks? 
This research paper will first cover risk management on a theoretical level and then the first 
stage of the case company’s security risk management process, which is the risk analysis, on a 
more practical level. The scope of the risk analysis is eight sub-business units in Finland and a 
sub-business unit in Estonia. Only risks related to security are included in this risk analysis. 
However, the resulting tool can be adopted for other risk areas. The final instructions and 
recommendations from management from the headquarters, in other words the response, 
monitoring, and final reporting stages, will be excluded from this thesis.  
1.2 Key Concepts 
Here are definitions for the most relevant terminology in this paper. 
Risk, according to the ISO 31000 standard (2018, 6), is the effect of uncertainty on objectives. 
Here, an effect is considered a deviation from what is expected. Juvonen et al. (2014, 8-10) 
conclude that there are three factors connected to risk: the uncertainty, the expectations, and 
the scale and the seriousness of an event. The Institute of Risk Management sees risk as a 
combination of the probability of an event and its consequences which can be either positive 
or negative (A Risk Management Standard 2002, 2). 
Risk analysis is part of the risk assessment process. Its goal is to understand the nature of risk 
and to find the appropriate risk levels. The factors to consider are uncertainties, risk sources, 
consequences, likelihood, events, scenarios, controls, and how effective these controls are. 
(SFS-ISO 31000:2018, 16.) 
Risk assessment is a process that has typically three main phases: risk identification, risk 
analysis, and risk evaluation (Juvonen et al. 2014, 18). Risk assessment in an organisation can 
be a top-down or a bottom-up exercise depending on whether it is undertaken by the 
management level or the local business unit level (Hopkin 2017, 120). 
Risk management is comprised of coordinated actions, the goal of which is to guide and control 
risk activities in an organisation (SFS-ISO 31000:2011, 13). It is a process that helps organisations 
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understand, evaluate, and take actions on risks. The aim is to increase the probability of success 
and to decrease the likelihood of failure. (Hopkin 2017, 46.) 
Security can be defined as freedom from danger. It is safety against internal and external 
threats. Typically it refers to being safe from intentional, criminal activities. (OED 2018.) The 
concept of security is broad, multidimensional, and dependent on the context it is used in. 
Security can be further classified into categories of, for example, physical security, information 
and computing security, criminology, and business continuity management. (Brooks 2009, 1-8.) 
2 Case Company 
This chapter will first discuss the case company in general. Then, the constitution and the 
structure of the organisation are explained. Finally, the case company’s current risk 
management approach and risk assessment process are described.  
2.1 Organisation 
The case company is an IT and business consulting and outsourcing company which was founded 
in the 1970s in Northern America. Now a global organisation with tens of thousands of 
professionals in hundreds of locations and a revenue of close to seven billion Euros (2017), the 
company helps its clients with their digital transformation by offering end-to-end solutions. The 
case company has expertise in several industries, including banking, communications, 
transportation and logistics, manufacturing, and utilities. It has clients both in public and in 
private sectors. (Internal material about the case company 2018.) 
The case company strives to create an environment in which its employees enjoy working 
together for a company they can be proud of. This idea was formulated back in the 1970s when 
the company was founded. It is supported with a vision, a mission, and values that together 
form the company constitution. The company vision is to be a leader in its own field and to 
help its clients succeed. Its mission is to provide outstanding quality, competence, and 
objectivity through best services and solutions to fully meet clients’ expectations. The principle 
values that guide all the employees and shareholders are partnership and quality, objectivity 
and integrity, intrapreneurship and sharing, respect, financial strength, and corporate social 
responsibility. (Internal material about the case company 2018.) 
The global organisation is divided into strategic business units and further to business units. 
The business unit of Finland and Estonia is part of the Northern Europe strategic business unit 
which is made up of eight countries. Every business unit has sub-business units which are formed 
on the basis of their business operations. In Finland, the company has close to 20 locations and 
employs almost 4 000 people. In Estonia there are two locations, and together they employ 
over 200 people. (Internal material about the case company 2018.) 
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2.2 Security Risk Management 
The company has divided risks into seven areas: 1) winning business, 2) operational excellence, 
3) member risks, 4) security risks, 5) compliance risks, 6) strategic business unit and corporate 
strategic risks, and 7) nascent risks. The risks in the fourth area, security risks, are included in 
the scope of this thesis. The company’s security risk management process is an essential part 
of the company’s security management framework, and it is aligned with the Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) approach. The process is owned by the case company’s global security 
organisation. It is a continual process which identifies, prioritises, and responds to risks. The 
company’s risk management is a joint, global effort to ensure comprehensible evaluations and 
cost-efficient solutions. The goal is to protect the organisation, its assets, and its operations 
by supporting the management in making the right decisions. (Internal material about risk 
management 2018.) 
Security risks are further divided into four domains: Protecting sensitive and critical 
information, Protecting critical business infrastructure, Safeguarding physical assets and 
facilities, and Protecting people. Several threats have been identified for all these domains. 
The guiding principles are as follows: 1) Common solutions for the organisation are preferred, 
2) The global chief information officer is responsible for designing IT solutions for technical 
controls, 3) Business units are accountable for their risks and responsible for their risk 
mitigation efforts, and 4) Adjustments in business units are made based on identified technical 
and operational risk events and trends. (Internal material about risk management 2018.) 
The risk management process has three main stages: risk analysis, risk response, and risk 
monitoring and reporting. The annual risk assessment process is part of the risk analysis stage. 
Its main goal is to find common solutions for the most significant risks. The assessment process 
utilises a bottom-up approach. This means that the risk assessment work begins at the sub-
business unit level and finishes at the enterprise level view on required risk mitigation actions. 
The risk assessment process is initiated in workshops where the business unit’s security lead 
acts as a facilitator and subject matter experts provide the input. An enterprise-level risk 
assessment tool is used for this purpose. The outcome is a business unit security risk assessment 
draft. (Internal material about risk management 2018.) 
2.3 Security Risk Assessment 
In the risk analysis phase, potential security risks are identified using different sources. After 
the potential risks have been identified, risks are assessed to get an accurate picture of the 
risk exposure and how it relates to the case company’s risk tolerance. Security events are 
followed up on and resolved on an ongoing basis. In the annual risk assessment, risk levels are 
identified and appropriate responses determined using a bottom-up approach. An enterprise-
level risk assessment tool is used for this purpose. There are five risk levels: very low, low, 
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moderate, high, and very high. They are determined using the model presented in Figure 1. 
(Internal material about risk management 2018.) 
 
Figure 1: The model for calculating risk levels (Internal material about risk management 2018) 
Identified threats to security fall under four risk domains: 4.1 Protecting sensitive and critical 
information, 4.2 Protecting critical business infrastructure, 4.3 Safeguarding physical assets 
and facilities, and 4.4 Protecting people. The number four refers to the area of security risks, 
and the second number to the domain within the area of security risks. The identified threats 
for 4.1 are equipment, media, documents theft or loss, human error, hacking, system sabotage 
or system intrusion, insider threat, malware, sniffing or tampering of communications, and 
social engineering attacks. The risk domain of 4.2. covers the threats of human error, hacking, 
system sabotage or system intrusion, insider threat, malware, denial of service attack, 
technical infrastructure or application failure, criminal or interpersonal threats or violence 
including collective actions, physical threats and hazards including transportation and 
traveling, and natural disasters. The threats for 4.3 are criminal or interpersonal threats or 
violence including collective actions, physical threats and hazards including transportation and 
traveling, and natural disasters. The risk domain of 4.4 includes the threats of criminal or 
interpersonal threats or violence including collective actions, physical threats and hazards 
including transportation and traveling, natural disasters, and medical or health issues. Many of 
these identified threats are connected to information technology. (Internal material about risk 
management 2018.) 
Every threat has also a type: deliberate, accidental, or natural. Threats have five possible 
levels: doubtful (1), uncertain (2), anticipated (3), expected (4), and confirmed (5). The threat 
level is determined on the basis of how likely the threat is to occur or be initiated. There are 
five vulnerability levels: very low (1), low (2), moderate (3), high (4), and very high (5). These 
levels are based on the effectiveness of existing security controls and how quickly the company 
can recover from a risk that has occurred. (Internal material about risk management 2018.) 
The resulting likelihood figure estimates the probability of a threat exploiting a vulnerability. 
It has five levels: slight (<10%), not likely (10-30%), likely (30-60%), high likely (60-90%), and 
expected (>90%). Impact, which can be either direct or indirect, describes the consequences 
of a risk for the company as shown in Table 1 (Internal material about risk management 2018): 
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Impact Level Description 
5 Critical Loss of ability to achieve company’s objectives and sustain ongoing 
operations 
4 Very important Materiality reduced ability to achieve company’s objectives 
3 Important Moderate impact on the achievement of company’s objectives 
2 Low importance Disruption of normal activities with limited effect on the 
achievement of company’s objectives 
1 No impact No material impact on the achievement of company’s objectives 
Table 1: The five impact levels and their descriptions (Internal material about risk management 
2018) 
Velocity is an estimation of how quickly the impact of the risk affects the company. It does not 
have an effect on the risk level as such, but instead it helps in planning and prioritising risk 
mitigation efforts. Velocity has three levels: high (less than three months), medium (3-12 
months), low (more than 12 months). Most of the risks in the case company have a high velocity 
level; in other words, risks affect the company in under three months. There are three main 
outcomes of the annual risk assessment process: an Enterprise Security Annual Report to 
support strategic planning, Enterprise Security Plans to address risks, and Business Unit Security 
Plans to mitigate local risks. (Internal material about risk management 2018.) 
3 Methodology 
The strategy applied to this study is a qualitative and functional thesis. Literature review and 
participant observation are used to collect data, and content analysis is used to analyse the 
collected data. The strategy and the methods are explained in more detail in this chapter.  
3.1 Qualitative and Functional Thesis 
The purpose of qualitative research is to understand a phenomenon without using statistical or 
other quantitative methods. Unlike quantitative research, it does not attempt to make 
generalisations and it is not based on a specific theory or well-known models. Instead, the goal 
is to have a thorough view on the subject under research, and the results are only applicable 
to the specific case. The phenomenon is described using the written word rather than through 
figures, and thus, qualitative research is descriptive in nature. The logic is typically inductive, 
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that is to say, reasoning progresses from individual instances to conclusions. (Kananen 2014a, 
16-20.) 
Different techniques for qualitative research are, for example, case research, action research, 
functional research, and ethnographic research. The combination of qualitative and 
quantitative strategy is blended research. A variety of methods can be used to collect and 
analyse data. A qualitative research process in cyclical in nature. Analysis is part of every phase 
of research, from the gathering of material to final conclusions, and it guides and supports the 
entire process. There is a direct link between the researcher and the phenomenon under 
research. The research is carried out in the genuine context of the phenomenon: the researcher 
enters the field to do interviews or to make observations, for example. (Kananen 2014a, 18-
22.) 
A functional thesis combines theory and actions, and it is an alternative to a thesis that is more 
focused on research. Despite this, it must fulfil the general requirements of an academic thesis 
by including, for example, an adequate level of research communication. A functional thesis is 
by nature heavily grounded in practical work. The purpose is to produce something concrete: 
instructions, guidelines, a programme, or an event, for example. Theory is applied to find a 
suitable approach and a basis for decisions. The theoretical framework and definitions guide 
the thesis process. (Vilkka & Airaksinen 2003, 5-50.) 
A functional thesis must always explain the entire creation process of the final product. The 
execution of the product should be such that it benefits the target group as much as possible. 
Things to consider when planning a product are usability, costs, image, and scale, among other 
things. The final thesis report is a description and evaluation of the process, results, and 
conclusions. It is written alongside the development of the resulting product. Both of these 
processes, writing and development, complement each other and should be inseparable. (Vilkka 
& Airaksinen 2003, 51-67.)  
3.2 Methods 
A literature review is the first method of collecting data for this thesis. Chapter four is based 
on this method. By doing a literature review, a researcher proves that they are aware and are 
able to interpret what is already known about the phenomenon. A literature review has many 
benefits. It deepens the understanding of the study field before the actual research process 
begins. However, the researcher must be aware of the possible problem this poses: fixed 
perceptions of the phenomenon may narrow down the perspective and affect, consciously or 
unconsciously, decisions made during the research. A literature review helps in defining 
terminology and in finding the right meters, among other things. By doing this, the researcher 
can ground the study to existing theory. The use of literature also increases the validity of 
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research because existing material supports the researcher in making decisions and conclusions. 
(Kananen 2009, 74-76; Jesson, Matheson & Lacey 2012, 10.) 
Before a literature review can be carried out, a research question must be defined. The 
research question will then determine the focus and scope of the literature review. (Jesson et 
al. 2012, 18-19.) According to Kananen (2009, 73), written sources include materials gathered 
through observing, interviews, and a research diary during the thesis process, as well as existing 
documents connected to the phenomenon. In this thesis, the literature used is published works 
and websites in the field of risk and research methodology, and unpublished company-specific 
documents. 
The second method of collecting data for this thesis is participant observation. The method of 
observation is used to get information about people’s actions and behaviour. It takes into 
account both verbal and nonverbal expression. It is a method where the researcher participates 
in the activities of the research subjects and in this way, becomes a member of their group, 
organisation, or community. Consequently, the researcher does not just observe the 
phenomenon, but also feels it. (Gill & Johnson 2002, according to Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
2009, 289-290; Havainnointi eli observointi 2015.) This involves an immersion in the research 
setting (Delbridge & Kirkpatrick 1994, according to Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009, 290). 
A participant observer can have different roles. Gill and Johnson (2002, according to Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill 2009, 293-294) have identified the following four roles: complete participant, 
complete observer, observant as participant, and participant as observer. A complete 
participant and a complete observer do not reveal their researcher identity. The researcher’s 
position in this study resembles the most the role of an observer as participant. An observer as 
participant does not participate in the activities in the same way as main participants, but 
rather focuses on observing and assisting. (Gill & Johnson 2002, according to Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill 2009, 293-294.) The observations will be made in the workshops as well as 
throughout the process through different methods of communications, such as face-to-face 
discussions and emails. An observational checklist is presented in Appendix 1. Additionally, 
other observations made throughout the process will be taken into account. 
Content analysis is used to analyse the collected data. According to Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2018, 
103), content analysis is a basic analysis method in qualitative research, and most of the 
methods in qualitative research are actually based on content analysis. Its purpose is to produce 
concise and clear content of the research material which will then help the researcher to make 
reliable conclusions. The material can be anything in written form, such as transcribed 
interviews, articles, report, and memos. (Ojasalo, Moilanen & Ritalahti 2009, 121.) 
Content analysis is based on logical deduction and interpretations. The main phases are the 
collecting and preparing of the research material, the simplification of the research material, 
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and recognition and interpretation of recurrent patterns. Critical review is part of all these 
three phases. Before the analysis can begin, the researcher must decide if they are only going 
to analyse the manifest content or also the latent content. In this thesis, content analysis is 
used to go through the manifest content of the local risk assessment results. (Ojasalo, Moilanen 
& Ritalahti 2009, 121-123.) 
Validity and reliability are concepts that are used to assess the results of a research. Validity 
refers to how well the methods and findings represent the phenomenon the researcher is 
studying. Reliability refers to consistency: if the research was to be repeated, the results should 
remain the same. Validity is focused on research design and partly on the analysis of data. 
Reliability is connected to the execution of the research. (Kananen 2014a, 146-147.) A 
functional thesis must abide by certain ethical rules. The goals should be morally sound, the 
development project is to be conducted with honesty and care, and the results must be truly 
applicable in practice. (Ojasalo et al 2009, 48-50.) 
4 Risk Management 
Risk management is an essential component of a business’ strategic management. It is to be a 
continuous, developing process which considers risks related to past, present, and future 
activities. Systematic and clearly communicated risk management can increase the level of 
trust and respect towards the company. (A Risk Management Standard 2002, 2; Leino, Steiner 
& Wahlroos 2005, 145). This chapter first describes security and then the nature of risk, 
especially from an organisational point of view. Some examples of categorising risks are given. 
Then, the concepts of corporate governance and enterprise risk management are explained. 
The risk management process is introduced by presenting some of the most common 
approaches. The focus of this thesis, risk assessment is described in more detail. 
4.1 Security 
The concept of security refers to an objective and external state, or a subjective and 
experienced state, or a relationship between the former and the latter. First of all, security 
can be seen as a basic human need, and the fulfilment of needs is the basis of well-being. 
(Maslow 1987, Alderfer 1972, Riihinen 1979 according to Niemelä 2000, 21-22.) Secondly, 
security is a humane and social value. It is predictability, tranquillity, and the absence of 
dangers (Kaufmann according to Niemelä 2000, 22). Thirdly, security can be considered a basic 
human right. People have their own impressions of security which are based on experiences, 
observations, and what they have learned. The feeling of security comes from routines, 
stability, trust, and predictability. Security and insecurity are part of all areas of human life. 
Security is defined in different ways depending on the context. For example, information 
security can be defined as the protection of sensitive information. The concepts of risk, threat, 
danger, and fear are closely related to insecurity, the opposite of security. Risk assessments 
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are connected to the feeling of insecurity and the attempt to manage this feeling. Risk 
management aims to reduce existing insecurity and to make the future as secure as possible. 
(Niemelä 2000, 23-25;  Purpura 2011, 9 & 324; Tikkanen et al. 2009, 13.) 
When it comes to organisations, security can be defined as a state where there are no 
uncontrollable, unpredictable, or sudden events that result in losses. Risks are on an acceptable 
level and their mitigation is efficient. The role of security in an organisation is the protection 
of employees, assets, operations, environment, and reputation. The goal is to ensure that the 
set objectives are reached without interruptions. This is achieved by methodology and 
strategies. The security methodology serves as the foundation for the implementation of 
security strategies. It includes methods, disciplines, theories, and concepts, for example. 
Security strategies, derived from the methodology, refer to the application of different aspects 
of security, such as physical security and information security. Different strategies are 
deterrence, deception, detection, delay, denial, mitigation, and response. These strategies 
protect, for example, from violence, theft, computer crime, fire, accidents, fraud, espionage, 
substance abuse, disasters, and terrorism. Risk management is the foundation of corporate 
security, because decisions connected to security should be based on a risk analysis. (Purpura 
2011, 10-11; Tikkanen et al. 2009, 13 & 88-104.) 
The security risk assessment of the case company is heavily focused on information security. 
The fundamental principles of information security are confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. This is often referred to as the CIA triad. The goal of confidentiality is to ensure 
the appropriate level of secrecy and to prevent unauthorised disclosure. Integrity is concerned 
with the accuracy and reliability of information and the prevention of unauthorised 
modifications. The purpose of availability is to guarantee that authorised users have timely 
access to data and resources. Controls to minimise information security risks can be 
administrative, technical, and physical, for example, training, firewalls, and locked server 
rooms. These are categories of controls. When a variety of controls are used, this is called 
defense-in-depth. Different functionalities of information security controls are preventive, 
detective, corrective, deterrent, recovery, and compensating. (Harris & Maymi 2016, 3-10.) 
4.2 Organisational Risks 
Risks that are related to organisations can arise from a variety of sources. Merna & Al-Thani 
(2010, 16) provide a list of typical sources: political, environmental, planning, market, 
economic, financial, natural, project, technical, regulatory, human, criminal, safety, and legal. 
In short, a risk source can be anything that can have an influence on business. If this influence 
is uncertain and significant, it gives rise to a risk. (Merna & Al-Thani 2010, 16-17.) 
There are many ways to classify risks. Risks can be either dynamic or static. Dynamic risks, such 
as political and financial risks, are affected by situational factors, and they can have both 
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positive and negative outcomes. Business risks are usually dynamic in nature. Static risks, on 
the other hand, have only negative outcomes. They are easier to predict than dynamic risks. 
Static risks are pure and insurable risks which are not significantly affected by the business 
environment. (Kuusela & Ollikainen 2005, 31-34.)  
Hopkin (2017, 17) uses the following model of four categories: compliance or mandatory risks, 
hazard or pure risks, control or uncertainty risks, and opportunity or speculative risks. 
Compliance risks are minimised, hazard risks mitigated, control risks managed, and opportunity 
risks embraced. An opportunity risk is an example of a risk that can have a positive outcome. 
(Hopkin 2017, 17.) 
Moeller (2007, 25) presents a sample of what an organisation’s risk model could look like. It has 
four categories: strategic risks, operations risks, finance risks, and information risks. Strategic 
risks include external factor risks, such as economy risks, and internal factor risks, such as 
reputation risks. Operations risks comprise of process, compliance, and people risks. Treasury, 
credit, and trading risks are all finance risks. Information risks refer to financial, operational, 
and technological risks. (Moeller 2007, 25.) 
4.3 Corporate Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
The terms “corporate governance” and “risk management” often appear in the same context. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD (G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance 2015, 9) sees corporate governance as a set of relationships between 
management, the board, shareholders, and other stakeholders. It is a structure that helps an 
organisation to define its objectives, to find the means to achieve them, and to decide how 
performance is monitored. Corporate governance is a combination of processes and 
organisational structures which the management has created. The goal is to have a corporate 
environment which is characterised by trust, transparency, and accountability. This 
environment is a basis for long-term investments, financial stability, and business integrity, 
which in turn support growth. The OECD has published principles of corporate governance to 
guide organisations with their governance practices. (G20/OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2015, 7-9; Hyvä hallinto- ja johtamistapa (corporate governance) 2017.) 
Leino et al. (2005, 124) state that corporate governance is a mechanism for managing and 
controlling a business. In other words, it describes how an organisation is managed. An 
important element of corporate governance is internal controls. Their purpose is to ensure that 
objectives are reached, resources are used wisely, and risks are efficiently managed. Thus, risk 
management is part of internal controls and corporate governance. Consequently, management 
is responsible for suitable risk management. This can be seen in corporate governance 
recommendations. (Leino et al. 2005, 123-126.) In Finland, for example, a listed company 
should first set forth the principles for internal auditing, and then describe how its risk 
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management is organised. Shareholders are to be informed of significant risks. (Suositus 
listayhtiöiden hallinnointi- ja ohjausjärjestelmistä (Corporate Governance) 2003, 13.) 
Hopkin (2017, 4) summarises the reasons for risk management as mandatory, assurance, 
decision-making, and effective and efficient core processes. The ultimate goal is to bring value. 
(Hopkin 2017, 4-56.) There are several external and internal requirements which direct 
organisations in risk management. External requirements come mainly from legislation, risk 
management standards, recommendations specific to a business field, and customer contracts. 
Internal requirements are those that have been agreed upon through the company vision, 
values, strategies, policies, and guidelines, for example. In addition to requirements, the 
increasingly rapid change in environments, particularly due to globalisation and digitalisation, 
make risk management an essential part of a successful business. (Ilmonen, Kallio, Koskinen & 
Rajamäki 2013, 18-19; Merna & Al-Thani 2010, 1.) 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is a holistic approach to managing risks that is commonly 
used in large organisations. According to ERM, risk management is a multidirectional and 
continual process where all different areas are interrelated. (Hopkin 2017, 96; Ilmonen et al. 
2013, 26.) The basic idea behind ERM is that the goal for all business units is to create value 
for stakeholders. The benefits of ERM are considered to be better management of uncertainties, 
minimisation of losses, achievement of targets, and maintaining reputation. For ERM to be 
successful, it must be tied to a company’s strategic and planning processes, daily monitoring 
and reporting, and internal auditing, for example. (Leino et al. 2005, 126-136.) An example of 
an ERM framework is COSO ERM, published in 2004, which is designed for organisations of all 
sizes and types (Moeller 2007, x). It has four main objectives: high-level goals which support 
the company mission, efficient use of resources, reliable reporting, and compliance with laws 
and regulations (Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework. Executive Summary 
2004, 3). 
4.4 Risk Management Process 
According to Merna and Al-Thani (2010, 2), risk management is a formal process which includes 
four main phases: identification, assessment, planning, and management of risks. All levels of 
an organisation should participate in this process. Risk management involves coordinated 
activities, the goal of which is to direct and control organisations in relation to risks. It creates 
and protects value. It supports organisations with their performance, innovation work, and 
achievement of goals. The principles of good risk management, as seen in the ISO 31000 
standard, are illustrated in Figure 2. Risk management should be integrated, structured and 
comprehensive, customized, inclusive, and dynamic, use the best available information, take 
human and cultural factors into account, and be continually improved. (ISO 31000:2018, 6-8). 
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Figure 2: Principles of good risk management (ISO 31000:2018, 8) 
An organisation’s risk management process is typically based on a standard. According to Hopkin 
(2017, 72), a risk management standard describes a risk management process and a 
recommended framework. The most common standards are ISO 31000, IRM Standard, and the 
COSO ERM. (SFS-ISO 31000:2018; A Risk Management Standard 2002; Enterprise Risk 
Management – Integrated Framework. Executive Summary 2004.) All the standards follow more 
or less the same basic structure: 1) setting of a risk management scope, 2) identifying threats 
and opportunities, 3) assessing risks, 4) planning and implementing risk management responses, 
5) reporting and communicating, and 6) evaluating the quality and success of risk management 
regularly (Ilmonen et al. 2013, 27). 
ISO 31000 (2018, 9) provides an example of risk management framework as illustrated in Figure 
3. This sees risk management as a continuous process which is made up of integration, design, 
implementation, evaluation, and improvement. An essential part of this framework is the 
support of leadership and commitment. (ISO 31000:2018, 9.) 
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Figure 3: Risk management framework (ISO 31000:2018, 9) 
 
Figure 4 is based on the ISO 31000 standard, and it presents a typical risk management process. 
It begins with establishing the scope, the context, and the criteria. The next phase, on which 
this thesis focuses, is the risk assessment phase which includes risk identification, risk analysis, 
and risk evaluation. This is followed by risk treatment which includes selecting and 
implementing appropriate ways to address risks. The whole process is supported with 
communication, consultation, monitoring, and review. (ISO 31000:2018, 13-19.) 
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Figure 4: Risk management process (ISO 31000:2018, 16) 
The very first step is to establish a scope and to make sure that it is clearly communicated to 
all relevant parties. The process can be applied to a strategical level or it may only concern an 
individual project, for example. When establishing a scope, the following points should be 
considered: objectives, expected outcomes, time, location, inclusions and exclusions, tools and 
techniques, resources, responsibilities, records, and relationships with other processes and 
activities. (SFS-ISO 31000:2018, 14.) 
Both internal and external context that have the potential to affect the achievement of an 
organisation’s objectives are to be established. This is a crucial step that has an effect on the 
subsequent risk assessment. External context can be divided into three categories: 1) 
international, national, regional and local social, cultural, political, legal, regulatory, financial, 
technological, natural, and competitive environments, 2) key risk sources and trends associated 
with the organisation, and 3) external stakeholders. The internal context includes 
organisational structure and culture, roles, responsibilities, capacity, capabilities, internal 
systems, and internal stakeholders. The established context is documented in written form, 
approved by management, and used for monitoring and review. (ISO 31000 Risk Management. 
A practical guide for SMEs 2015, 39-42.) 
The criteria states organisational objectives, values, resources, and legal and regulatory 
obligations, and it is to be in line with the organisation’s policies. The criteria should include: 
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1) the nature and type of causes and consequences and how they are measured, 2) how 
likelihood is defined, 3) the timeframe for likelihood and consequences, 4) how risk levels are 
calculated, 5) stakeholder views, 6) the level of acceptable risks, and 7) how the combination 
of risks is considered. The criteria helps to determine the significance of risks and to compare 
risk levels. (ISO 31000 Risk Management. A practical guide for SMEs 2015, 47-49.) 
4.5 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment has several objectives. It is a process that helps organisations to make decisions 
to control and manage risks in a cost-effective and efficient way. It provides a method for 
examining threats, vulnerabilities, and their impact. Risk assessment brings risk awareness 
among employees and guides them in contributing to risk control. It is a basis of successful risk 
management and it helps to ensure that risk management meets business objectives. (Burns-
Howell et al. 2003, 17.) Risk assessment typically includes three phases: risk identification, risk 
analysis, and risk evaluation. It should be an exercise which is conducted regularly and which 
involves several stakeholders who all bring their respective expertise and views to the table. 
(ISO 31000:2018, 15.)  
In risk identification, relevant risks are identified and described. Relevant risks are those that 
have some level of probability of affecting a business within a time period that is considered 
reasonable. An efficient approach is to involve employees at all levels of the organisation, who 
will help identify and assess risks in their own units. The COSO ERM models proposes a 
brainstorming approach to start off the identification phase. (Moeller 2007, 23-24.)  
Risk identification is a critical task because only those risks that have been identified will be 
considered in the following phases of the risk management process. Risk identification should 
include both internal and external risks. The review of external and internal context, 
established in the previous stage, helps to identify these risks. It is crucial to have up-to-date 
information for the results to be valid and reliable. Once the risks have been identified, 
sufficient information should be provided for each risk. This includes objectives that could be 
impacted, the context of the risk, conditions or sources that are required for the risk to 
materialise, possible consequences of the risk, and current controls for the risk. (ISO 
31000:2018, 15-16; Merna & Al-Thani 2010, 47; ISO 31000 Risk Management. A practical guide 
for SMEs 2015, 63-64.) 
Identified risks are typically presented in the form of a risk register. At the same time, a risk 
register can be used to record current controls and to recommend future controls to better 
manage risks. A possible downside of this practice is that only threats in the register are 
considered and the risk management process is no longer sufficiently dynamic. A risk register 
should rather be viewed as an action plan which describes the current status of the risk 
management and the needed controls. (Hopkin 2017, 88-92.) 
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The second step is to analyse the identified risks and to determine risk levels. In this phase, an 
understanding of risks is developed. The factors considered here are typically uncertainties, 
risk sources, consequences, likelihood, events, scenarios, and controls and their effectiveness. 
The approach can be qualitative, quantitative, or both. Usually the approach and methodology 
is determined by the risk management framework. (ISO 31000:2018, 16-17; ISO 31000 Risk 
Management. A practical guide for SMEs 2015, 65-66.) 
Some of the qualitative techniques for analysing risks, according to Merna and Al-Thani (2010, 
68-76), are brainstorming, assumption analysis, Delphi, interviews, hazard and operability 
studies (HAZOP), failure modes and effects criticality analysis (FMECA), checklists, prompt lists, 
risk registers, risk mapping, probability-impact tables, risk matrix charts, and project risk 
management road mapping. Quantitative techniques include decision trees, a control interval 
and memory technique, a Monte Carlo simulation, a sensitivity analysis, and a probability-
impact grid analysis. The technique used in the case company’s risk assessment is probability-
impact tables, which represent a qualitative approach. Assessing risks is not based on an exact 
science, but rather on subjective estimations. The same circumstances can yield different 
results when different individuals assess risks. Because perceptions, opinions, and judgements 
can have an impact on the results, it is important to involve several stakeholders in this process. 
(Merna & Al-Thani 2010, 33-84.) 
The final step of risk assessment is risk evaluation. Its aim is to support decisions made about 
risk treatment. Risk analysis results are compared with the company’s risk appetite, and based 
on this, risks are either accepted or treated. (ISO 31000:2018, 17; ISO 31000 Risk Management. 
A practical guide for SMEs 2015, 66.) If in risk evaluation, the last phase of risk assessment, 
there are intolerable risks that are not sufficiently controlled, risk treatment is called for. Risk 
treatment methods should be cost-efficient and in line with external requirements. Different 
risk treatment options are: 1) avoidance, 2) pursuance of opportunities, 3) changing the 
likelihood, 4) changing the consequences, 5) sharing the risk, and 6) retaining the risk. The goal 
of risk treatment is to reduce the risks that have potentially negative effects and increase the 
risks that have potentially positive effects. (ISO 31000 Risk Management. A practical guide for 
SMEs 2015, 67-69.) 
Both the risk management framework and the process should be regularly monitored and 
reviewed. The ISO 31000 standard recommends the method of Plan-Do-Check-Act for this 
purpose. (ISO 31000 Risk Management. A practical guide for SMEs 2015, 73.) Monitoring helps 
to assure that the right controls are deployed and the agreed procedures are followed. If there 
are significant changes in the business environment, required modifications must be made 
accordingly. (A Risk Management Standard 2002, 11.) The purpose of communication is to 
improve awareness and understanding of risks. Consultation, on the other hand, provides 
feedback and support for the risk management process. Communication and consultation should 
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involve all relevant stakeholders and be part of every phase of the risk management process. 
Finally, the whole process and the results have to be documented. The purpose of recording 
and reporting is to inform the whole organisation about the risk management and its results, to 
provide relevant information that aids decision-making, to improve risk management, and to 
support interaction with stakeholders. (ISO 31000:2018, 14-19.) 
5 Process 
This chapter describes the whole process of this functional thesis. The aim is to validate the 
study: if the same steps are repeated, the result should remain the same. The process has been 
divided into the following phases: planning and preparing, and execution and finalising. The 
process flow in the spring of 2018 is presented in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: The process flow 
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5.1 Planning and Preparing 
The actual development process began before it became thesis work when in February 2018  
Finland’s security lead introduced the problem he had identified. After some planning on how 
to conduct risk assessment in the sub-business units, it became clear that the amount of work 
in the project is rather extensive. Thus, near the end of February the project was turned into 
a functional thesis and thesis planning could begin. 
The first stage was to outline an initial structure for the thesis and to collect data for the 
theoretical framework. This took place in March. Due to a fairly tight schedule, the new risk 
assessment tool and supporting material was continuously developed alongside this. The 
development of the tool began with designing a clear and practical layout. Only after this were 
the formulas and functions added. The supporting material was written using internal company 
material and electronic references that were considered reliable. Finland’s security lead gave 
feedback during this development phase. For example, he suggested making the tool look more 
like other Excel documents used in the company by removing additional information from the 
main sheet. He wished to have two additional tables for possible new risks and comments below 
the four security risk domains. 
During the designing phase, the scope of security risks changed, and the products had to be 
modified accordingly. Two risk domains were excluded from security risks and moved to another 
risk area. The two tables were removed from the tool and the functions changed accordingly. 
This also meant that some of the threats had to be taken out of the supporting material and 
the numbering of risks was changed. Once the tool and the other material were finished, an 
invitation was sent to sub-business units’ risk coordinators to take part in a security risk 
assessment kick-off workshop. This was organised by Finland’s security lead and the author of 
this thesis at the end of March. 
In the kick-off workshop in March, the risk assessment process was first explained to the risk 
coordinators. After this, the new risk assessment tool was introduced by presenting the idea 
behind it and by showing how it should be filled in. The sub-business units were given a deadline 
by which their risk assessment must be finished and be sent to the writer of this thesis to be 
further processed. This gave them two weeks to complete the task. To support the risk 
assessment, the risk coordinators were given the opportunity to have individual workshops with 
the author of this paper.  
During the risk assessment period, some questions arose which needed clarification, and this 
gave ideas to develop the supporting material further. For example, it was suggested by one 
risk coordinator that the impact and velocity should always be the same when critical or 
sensitive information is lost, regardless of the source of threat. It was clarified by the writer of 
this thesis that the nature of the threat does indeed affect impact and velocity. As an example, 
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the impact is likely to be smaller if an employee loses a laptop than if the entire company 
network is hacked. Laptops are locked and encrypted, and they can be remotely wiped. The 
impact would be very limited and the incident solved quickly. An entire network would have 
larger amounts of critical and sensitive information. It would be more difficult and laborious to 
remedy the incident, and the impact would be much greater as this incident would affect a 
large number of employees. This could also result in bad publicity and potentially in losing 
customers.  
No individual risk workshops were requested. Most of the risk assessments were returned by 
the given deadline in early April. Three risk assessments were not returned on time. Reminders 
were sent to those who had not delivered theirs. In the end, altogether eight risk assessments 
were completed. One assessment for a fairly large sub-business unit was not returned at all. 
5.2 Execution and Finalising 
After receiving the risk assessment results for most of the sub-business units, they were brought 
together in one document which would later be used in the next workshop in April 2018. The 
results included the assessment of predefined risks, assessment of new identified risks, and 
other comments. Next, a business unit level workshop was arranged between global security, 
including Finland’s security lead and the writer of this thesis, the Security Operation Centre 
(SOC), and the Infrastructure and IT Security department. The idea of this workshop was to go 
through the findings and to make a risk assessment of the whole business unit.  
Initially, the plan was to use the original, enterprise-level tool in this workshop, but it was 
decided to take advantage of the newly-developed tool because it was considered suitable for 
a risk assessment workshop. This business unit level risk assessment was not based on the 
averages of sub-business units’ assessments, because sub-business units vary in size, nature, 
and significance, and the final assessment is made by the security lead. Instead, the results 
were to be used as reference and support for making an accurate risk assessment for the whole 
business unit of Finland and Estonia. 
After the business unit level workshop in April, Finland’s security lead and the writer of this 
thesis transferred the results to the original enterprise-level tool. At this stage, all the decisions 
made in the business unit level workshop were considered one more time, and the sub-business 
unit risk assessments were reviewed again. As a result, some changes were still made in order 
for the risk assessment to be as accurate and realistic as possible. For example, it was decided 
that in the previous workshop, some of the values for threats had been estimated too high, and 
they were slightly lowered. Also, all the other risks identified in the sub-business units were 
discussed. It was concluded that some of those risks, for example business continuity, were 
already included in other risk areas. Some risks could be considered to be part of the existing 
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security risks. For example, the threat of incorrectly understanding a situation and not 
reporting it properly, could be categorised as human error. 
After filling in the data in the enterprise-level tool with the final values for threat, 
vulnerability, and impact, the justifications for all the decisions were written down in the 
provided section. The risk level for one security risk domain, Protecting sensitive and critical 
information, became high. This risk domain includes the following threats: equipment, media, 
and documents theft or loss, human error, hacking, system sabotage, system intrusion, insider 
threat, malware, sniffing or tampering communications, and social engineering attacks. These 
are threats that large companies in particular face regularly. These threats also develop 
quickly. For example, new malware variants are constantly being authored. This means that 
companies have to be able think on their feet and improve and modify their controls quickly. 
Actions are required to mitigate and control risks that have a high risk level. For this particular 
domain, a root cause description of significant threats and control weaknesses, and a potential 
business impact were provided. This will help the planning of risk treatment. Other risk domain 
levels were either moderate, low, or very low. Moderate risk levels are monitored, low and 
very low risk levels are accepted. (Internal material about risk management 2018.) 
The thesis process culminated in a strategic business unit level risk workshop in April 2018 
where Finland’s security lead and the writer of this thesis presented the risk assessment results 
and the newly developed tool for other business units in Northern Europe. The current status 
of the company risk management was discussed and areas of improvement were found. These 
included the lack of cooperation and resources. Finally, the results were analysed and 
documented in this thesis in May 2018. 
6 Results 
The concrete outcome of this research is a local risk assessment tool which is used to provide 
accurate results for the enterprise-level risk assessment tool. In addition, supporting material 
was compiled to help the risk assessment process in workshops. The development of the tool 
and the supporting material are presented in this chapter. The final products are the case 
company’s intellectual property and for this reason will not be presented in this thesis in their 
entirety. The results of participant observation and the responses of relevant stakeholders are 
included in this chapter.  
6.1 Products 
The company has an enterprise-level risk assessment tool. It is a complicated, Microsoft Excel-
based tool which is best suited for reporting the final results for the entire business unit. 
Finland’s security lead recognised a need for a more simple and straightforward way to assess 
risks in sub-business units. Thus, the original tool was converted into a more suitable tool which 
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was first introduced in workshops for the relevant sub-business unit representatives and then 
for security leads of other business units.  
The main criterion for the new tool was that it should easy to comprehend and to use, even if 
the user is not experienced in assessing risks. It must be highly automated in terms of 
calculations, and it should eliminate the possibility of erroneous use as far as possible. The 
results are to be clearly visible with the help of a straightforward layout, colours, and 
summarising tables.  
The enterprise-level tool comprises user guidelines, general information, scope, risk analysis, 
results, and scales. The actual risk assessment is done in the risk analysis section. It is a very 
intricate tool, and in addition to the cells in which values are given, it contains information and 
space for explanations. As mentioned previously, this is more suitable for the final results and 
not for a hands-on workshop. The results of the risk assessment appear in the results section as 
shown in Table 2. This is only a small sample of the multi-sheet tool. 
 
Table 2: Risk analysis results in the Enterprise Security Risk Assessment tool 
Table 2 shows security risk domain 4.1: Protecting sensitive and critical information. This 
means that a company’s and clients’ information must be protected from being leaked or 
disclosed without authorisation. This information includes personally identifiable information. 
T1, T3, T4, and T5 are threats to sensitive and critical information. Threats have first been 
identified and only then categorised, and consequently T2 does not apply to 4.1. The 
identified threats can be reduced with process, people, and IT controls. Different controls for 
T1: equipment, media or documents theft or loss, include policies, disk encryption, and 
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authentication. The risk of T3: human error, can be reduced with insurances, backups, and 
training. Security monitoring and firewalls are used to control T4: hacking, system sabotage 
or system intrusion. Controls for T5: insider threat, include sanctions, separation of duties, 
and contractual agreements. These are only some examples of possible controls. Other 
threats to protecting sensitive and critical information are malware, sniffing or tampering 
communications, and social engineering attacks. The tool presents all of the four security 
risks and threats related to them in the same manner. 
Unless the reader is familiar with the layout, it is somewhat difficult to read and to interpret 
the results. The structure of the table is two-fold, and the text is both vertical and horizontal. 
Apart from risk levels, the depictive colours are only small circles instead of filling the entire 
cell. In the new version, the different threats under a risk domain have been presented on the 
left side of the chart (Appendix 2). Every risk domain has its own chart, and the weighted 
averages of that particular risk domain are calculated automatically in the small table under 
the main table. 
The workshop tool takes advantage of several formulas and functions. Designing and 
implementing these has been the most time-consuming part of the development process. The 
workshop participants are presented with a table which contains only the names of threats and 
their weight. First, the participants are instructed to fill in a value between 1 and 5 for threat 
and vulnerability. They can either type in the number or use the drop-down list. A value outside 
the range will prompt an error message. All the colours in the tool are inserted automatically 
based on the values. After the values for threat and vulnerability have been filled, the 
likelihood is calculated automatically. 
Next, impact is given a value between 1 and 5. Velocity can be either low, medium, or high. 
Also these values can be either written or chosen from the drop-down list. The velocity column 
uses a function which assigns a numerical value for each option: 1 for low, 2 for medium, and 
3 for high. As a result, it is possible to calculate the weighted average for velocity. Weight is 
based on predetermined values, and it is used in the weighted average calculations.  
The risk level is calculated automatically based on the values in the columns for likelihood and 
impact. The risk level column uses a function which turns a numerical value into a word: very 
low for 1, low for 2, moderate for 3, high for 4, very high for 5. The resulting risk level is clearly 
indicated with a colour and a word. The smaller, weighted average table uses formulas to 
automatically calculate the results for the particular risk domain based on the main table. The 
weighted results from these tables are automatically transferred to a table that summarises 
the result (Appendix 2). This table is presented at the top of the tool so that the reader can 
quickly get an idea of all the risks in the sub-business unit. 
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Those who participate in the risk assessment workshops do not necessarily have in-depth 
knowledge or experience of the threats that are to be assessed. The participants are all 
appointed as risk coordinators for their sub-business unit, but some of them are fairly new in 
their role and have only assessed current risks instead of risks for the entire coming fiscal year. 
Some of the threats, for example advanced persistent threat (APT), are very specific to IT, and 
the risk coordinators do not necessarily have a technical background. For these reasons, it was 
considered useful to create an informative Security Risk Guide.  
The Security Risk Guide took the form of a PowerPoint presentation. It was created in Finnish 
because it was suspected that some of the possible difficulties in assessing risks could be due 
to the English terminology. First, the guide introduces the four risk domains and lists all the 
threats related to them. For example, the risk domain of Safeguarding physical assets and 
facilities includes the following threats: criminal or interpersonal threats and violence, physical 
threats and hazards, and natural disasters. Then the guide gives very concise explanations for 
the threats identified in the risk assessment tool and lists protective measures. For example, 
natural disasters include storms, earthquakes, floods, and wildfires. Protective measures are, 
for example, an uninterruptible power supply (UPS), business continuity plans, and crisis 
management. Also, supporting questions for the risk assessment work are provided. For the risk 
domain of Safeguarding physical assets and facilities it is: “What are the most critical assets?” 
The threats covered in the presentation are the same as in the risk assessment tool. It was 
considered best to keep the guide as short as possible so that the busy risk coordinators would 
use it for support. The PowerPoint presentation includes eleven slides of bulleted lists. An 
excerpt of the guide is provided in Appendix 3. 
6.2 Observations and Response 
The security leads, risk coordinators, and other relevant stakeholders were observed 
throughout the thesis process in risk workshops and through other means of communication. 
Unfortunately, the opportunities for systematic participant observation were fewer than 
anticipated in the beginning of the thesis process. However, the observations made supported 
the choices made in designing the tool and the supporting material.  
The finished tool was sent to the risk coordinators of nine sub-business units. The risk 
coordinators were instructed on how to use the tool in a kick-off workshop. The initial response 
was positive: the new tool was considered straightforward and easy to use. The formulas and 
functions of the tool worked as planned. The tool worked correctly. Locking the cells that were 
not to be edited turned out to be a good decision. One sub-business unit had attempted to fill 
in values that were automatically calculated and asked the writer why they cannot edit the 
tool. Otherwise, the risk coordinators seemed to know how to use the tool correctly.  
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In the business unit level workshop, risk assessment as a whole received criticism, but not the 
localised tool per se. The scope of different security risk domains were considered uneven and 
somewhat difficult to grasp. The terms ‘threat’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘impact’ as well as the 
different scales were criticised for not being completely clear. However, these are established 
terms in the field of risk assessment. The new tool was considered a little confusing as the 
drop-down list had value 1 at the top and value 5 at the bottom, unlike in the value chart. This 
is illustrated in Figure 6. There was no other negative feedback or development suggestions 
that concerned specifically the new tool rather than the risk assessment in the company in 
general. No major shortcomings or areas to be developed were identified.  
 
Figure 6: The two directions of the scales 
The informal feedback from all the other security leads in the strategic business unit level risk 
workshop was very positive. Finland’s security lead and the writer of this thesis introduced the 
whole risk assessment process in Finland, including the new tool, to others. The tool was 
considered to be very clear and easy to use. Especially the possibility to add new identified 
risks was seen as an important improvement compared to the enterprise-level tool. All of the 
security leads wished to try out the tool, and they were asked to test it and to give more 
feedback and suggestions for further development and improvements. The feedback from this 
testing is excluded from this thesis due to time constraints. 
The Security Risk Guide was seen as a useful aid because it explains threats in a concrete and 
simple manner and it provides supporting questions. The decision was made early on to write 
this guide in Finnish because the identified threats may include terminology that is not clear to 
everyone. Only later did the writer of this thesis realise that the sub-business unit of Estonia 
would have needed this guide in English. In the comments section of the risk assessment tool, 
the Estonian risk coordinator concluded that a description of threats would have been useful. 
This proved the need for the guide. In addition, the security leads requested the supporting 
material in English so that they could use it in their business units. Thus, the guide should be 
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translated into English for future reference. There is a clear need for development. According 
to the observations made, the products appear to make the risk assessment process easier. 
7 Discussion 
According to the company’s security management framework, risk management is aligned with 
ERM, which is a holistic approach to risk management. A typical risk assessment is comprised 
of three stages: risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation (ISO 31000:2018, 16). The 
local risk assessment in the case company was focused on the risk analysis phase. Risks had 
been identified on a higher level. However, the new tool developed during this thesis gives 
stakeholders an opportunity to identify new threats which are then communicated further to 
higher levels. If there are risks that are assessed as high or very high, a description of threats 
and current controls is given. This is where the local risk assessment process ends. Decisions 
about mitigation efforts are made on a higher level. 
During the thesis process, it became apparent that the case company’s risk assessment process 
has some areas that might require improvement. During the literature review, it became clear 
that risk assessment is influenced by subjective perceptions, opinions, and judgements. Thus, 
assessment should always involve several stakeholders to be more objective and accurate. 
(Merna & Al-Thani 2010, 33.) Some sub-business unit assessments involved several stakeholders, 
but not all. Some assessments were completed by one stakeholder and then confirmed by 
another. Some assessments were based solely on one stakeholder’s view. 
It seems that not everyone involved in assessing risks were sufficiently informed about all the 
different aspects of risk assessment. For example, the meaning of different values was not 
completely clear to everyone. It is worth considering whether risk workshops with security leads 
should be made mandatory so that an expert in assessing security risks could guide the risk 
coordinators throughout the process. Currently, the risk workshops offered for sub-business 
units are optional. Apart from the initial kick-off workshop, no sub-business unit requested risk 
assessment workshops. An alternative to mandatory risk assessment workshops could be a more 
comprehensible security risk guide which provides more information about risk assessment. The 
guide produced during this thesis is focused on threats. Those who assess risks should dedicate 
a sufficient amount of time and effort in the process. It could be considered that some of the 
results submitted reflected to some degree both a lack of knowledge and a lack of effort. This 
evaluation is based on the overly optimistic assessments and on the attitudes observed. More 
training could be an answer to this problem. Hopkin (2017, 316) states that one of the main 
reasons for training is to make sure that assessments are consistent. 
Finland’s security lead has made a good effort in developing the case company’s risk assessment 
within his area of responsibility. The initiatives to develop a new tool to support his assessments 
and to organise workshops, among other things, indicate this. It is recommended that this 
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approach could be followed in other business units. In the final workshop, where all the security 
leads met face-to-face, it was noted that some security leads have insufficient knowledge of 
the whole risk assessment process. This is partly due to lack of experience. Some final risk 
assessments for other business units in Northern Europe were completed just in time for the 
final deadline, and they were based on one person’s views. More training could be considered 
in other business units, too. 
It is recommended that the case company stresses the importance of a holistic process: starting 
the risk assessment from the very bottom, in the sub-business units, and making it a chain of 
assessments all the way to the top. There should be more cooperation horizontally between 
different business units. The final workshop between the security leads was beneficial, but it 
also proved that, first of all, cooperation needs to start earlier in the process. Some problems 
and solutions became apparent only shortly before the final deadline. Secondly, every risk 
assessment should involve at least two employees. Some risk assessments that were based on 
one stakeholder’s view were overly optimistic. There could be two reasons for this: either those 
who make risk assessments are not able to make informed decisions about the threats, or the 
risk levels are kept low deliberately to avoid mitigation efforts. If more employees were 
involved in assessing risks, the results yielded would probably be more accurate. 
8 Conclusions and Self-Assessment 
The strategy applied was a qualitative and functional thesis. Literature review and participant 
observation were used to collect data, and content analysis was used to analyse the collected 
data. A qualitative and functional thesis was a suitable choice of strategy. The main focus of 
the thesis process was the concrete risk assessment tool, the Security Risk Guide, and the 
workshops. The approach was practical and closely tied to the business environment. The 
literature provided a solid background and guidance. The amount of risk management literature 
is so extensive that at times it was difficult to decide what should be included. Participant 
observation helped to transfer theory into practice and to find the right approach that would 
fill the case company’s specific needs. Content analysis was a good way to determine how 
successful the products of the thesis process are.  
The objective of this functional thesis was to determine how to best develop the local risk 
assessment methods of the case company. The purpose was that those, who represent their 
sub-business units, can assess security risks in an efficient and reliable manner. The intention 
was that with the help of these results, Finland’s security lead would be able to make an 
accurate and realistic risk assessment of the whole business unit. The identified research 
question was:  
What kind of local risk assessment method would support the security lead in 
assessing security risks? 
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It can be concluded that the simplified and localised tool developed by the writer can make 
the risk assessment more straightforward and efficient. This is based on the feedback that the 
participants, especially the security leads, have given, and on the observations made. However, 
some of the actual results of risk assessments were considered by the security lead to be 
somewhat unrealistic, in other words, too optimistic. As a conclusion, the risk assessment 
process should still be further developed by providing training, raising awareness, and 
increasing cooperation, for example. The Security Risk Guide was considered useful. However, 
it should be translated into English for other business units. It should also be considered whether 
the guide should be more informative about the risk assessment in general and not be solely 
focused on threats. Thus, the answer to the research question is that the local risk assessment 
tool and the guide produced during this thesis process can support the security lead in assessing 
risks, but that the development of the local risk assessment process should continue after this 
thesis. 
The strategy and the methods used in this thesis support the defined objectives well. The 
findings are specific to the phenomenon researched. The research question gets to the heart 
of the problem. The process has been described as objectively as possible. If the same research 
was repeated, the results should remain substantially the same. The outcomes can be 
considered reliable. It can be concluded that this thesis reaches sufficient levels of validity and 
reliability. Ojasalo et al. (2009, 48-50) state that the goals of a thesis should be morally sound, 
the development project is to be conducted with honesty and care, and the results must be 
truly applicable in practice. These rules have been followed in this thesis. The goals have been 
set by the case company and the writer with the best interests of the company in mind. The 
thesis work has been carried out as transparently and carefully as possible in the given 
circumstances. The result can be used to develop the case company’s risk assessment. 
The objectives set by the case company have been met. The products of the thesis have been 
deemed beneficial and can be used as such for future risk assessments or modified for other 
risk assessment needs, such as other risk areas or other units. If need be, the products can be 
developed further to meet new requirements. The full ownership and responsibility of the 
products are given to the case company after the completion of this thesis. It is suggested that 
the whole risk assessment process should be further developed, for example, based on the 
recommendations given in this thesis. After this, a new research could be carried out to see 
how improved cooperation, more training, and compulsory workshops or perhaps a more 
extensive Security Risk Guide have influenced risk assessment. 
Employment in the case company has been an invaluable advantage in the thesis process. Access 
to relevant documents specific to the company was made easy. The writer gained a good 
understanding of what is needed by talking and listening to stakeholders, and by just being 
present and observing. The scope of the security risk assessment changed in the middle of the 
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thesis process. The products and the thesis had to be modified accordingly. The timetable 
seemed tight at first, but the fixed timeframe helped the writer reach their targets on time for 
both the risk assessment and the thesis work.  
As the writer of this thesis, I am satisfied with the results. I have respected the wishes of the 
case company in my decisions and suggestions to improve risk assessment. I have explained the 
methods and the actual process as openly as possible without revealing the company’s 
intellectual property more than is necessary. The theory of risk assessment has been sufficiently 
covered, bearing in mind that this project is heavily grounded in an empirical and practical 
approach and it focuses on the concrete products.  
This thesis project has been a meaningful and interesting process. I have grown both as a 
security professional and as a scholar. I have learned to combine business, security, and 
research. My views on risk management, and on risk assessment in particular, have become 
more coherent and comprehensible. As the chief security officer of the case company has 
emphasised, security should be baked into the company strategy. It is not a separate function 
that can be bolted on almost as an afterthought. And risk management is part of security. A 
company that thrives tomorrow, will not take risks lightly today. It considers accurate risk 
assessment to be a factor of success.   
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Appendix 1: Observational checklist 
 
 
1. How the tool works. 
 
2. How well the risk coordinators know how to use the new tool. 
 
3. Possible shortcomings and areas to be developed with the tool. 
 
4. Attitudes towards the tool. 
 
5. The usefulness of the Security Risk Guide. 
 
6. Possible shortcomings and areas to be developed with the Security Risk Guide. 
 
7. How the new tool and the Security Risk Guide affect the assessment process. 
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Appendix 3: An excerpt of the Security Risk Guide 
 
